THE past week has seen what appears to be a rush to war with Russia by Sir Keir Starmer’s government in England
Well, they've got lots of illegal immigrants they can use as cannon fodder
Who can save England from Starmer’s rush to war?
By
Jonathon Riley
September 16, 2024
THE past week has seen what appears to be a rush to war with Russia by Sir Keir Starmer’s government – although what he proposes to use to prosecute such a war, given the parlous state of British defence, is not clear. In this article, I will review current events and try to see where matters are heading.
First, let us consider the state of the armed forces engaged in the war. The international affairs think tank Chatham House has examined the combat performance of Russian forces, identifying weaknesses and resource issues as well as basic force structures on land, by sea and in the air. It assesses that, in spite of heavy losses in manpower and equipment, the Russians have shown themselves capable of keeping up the pressure on Ukrainian forces at the tactical level and have continued to take territory in the East. Losses have been absorbed and replaced with new recruits and munitions, while the high command is looking hard at wholesale reforms for the long term, building on the increasing professionalisation of the armed forces that I identified in my last article. US official figures give up to 300,000 Russians killed, wounded and missing, detailed here and here. Ukrainian sources double that number, claiming in excess of 600,000 Russian casualties out of 3.57 million personnel in military service from an estimated pool of 69.4 million. Russia, as will be seen from the next section of this article, is therefore drawing in a far smaller proportion of its male population than its opponent.
What of Ukraine? The official figure for Ukraine’s population is 39 million and declining – it is projected to be 31 million in 2050. However, other figures suggest this figure is closer to 31 million now (not counting at least 6 million more who have fled the country). Of these, according to census data, 12.4 million are males aged between 15 and 64 giving a total potential pool of manpower for the armed forces, discounting those aged under 17 or over 60, of around 11 million – but again, the real figure is probably lower, perhaps no more than 8 million. The regular armed forces currently number 2.2 million active personnel and 1.2 million reservists, with a further 100,000 in paramilitary bodies. About a third of the available pool are therefore on military service which, given the need to keep other functions going – such as the police, health service, fire service, industry and agriculture, energy generation and so on – are probably all that can be found.
Estimates of casualties vary greatly, as is to be expected. US official figures give up to 190,000 Ukrainians killed, wounded, missing and captured and here. Ukrainian sources claim only 31,000 deaths among its own troops, with no figures for wounded, and 15,000 missing. However, former Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko claimed in January this year that Ukrainian casualties were at least 500,000, with 30,000 killed, wounded and missing every month. The number of heavily wounded soldiers being treated at one of Ukraine’s largest trauma hospitals has risen by as much as 30 per cent in the past few weeks. If that claim is true, then Ukraine has lost around 14 per cent of its total available manpower. Although the loss rate is probably greater than Ukraine’s ability to replace those casualties, the numbers (as a pure statistic) are bearable, as historical data indicates that armed bodies generally become combat-ineffective after loss rates of 20–25 per cent. However, casualties are generally concentrated in combat units and therefore their effectiveness is eroded more quickly and more sharply than the general figure suggests. Casualties, too, bear more heavily on younger men in active roles, whose loss has a long-term effect on the population structure. Ukraine has already lowered its age of conscription by two years to pull in more manpower. Although Ukraine has now taken on Western equipment and has received continued Western military support in training and mentoring its officers and soldiers, all is not quite as it seems. Very large-scale draft-dodging, in particular, has been an issue for more than a year.
Half a million young men dead, wounded or missing in two years? Great Britain, not counting the Empire, suffered 880,000 killed in the five years of the Great War, 6 per cent of the adult male population, and 13 per cent of the armed forces’ strength of four million. Another 920,000 were wounded, making a total loss of 1.8 million over five years out of a population of 46 million in 1914. If Lutsenko’s figures are anywhere near true, they indicate that Ukraine is losing men at a higher rate than Britain did during the ‘war to end all wars’. An even starker comparison is with French casualties in 1916 and 1917 – a total of just over 500,000 at Verdun, the Somme and the Chemin des Dames – and the result? Mutiny. On paper it may be possible for the Ukrainians to maintain this rate of loss, but how much will Ukrainian morale, especially civilian morale, bear?
What has been Ukraine’s strategic and operational approach of late? First, of course, there was a government reshuffle. Nine new ministers were appointed, including Andrii Sybiha as Foreign Minister and Herman Smetanin as Strategic Industries Minister, in charge of munitions production. This comes on top of the sacking of Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov last May, and Chief of the General Staff Valerii Zaluzhnyi earlier this year. Does this change anything? Not really. As several of the new ministers are former presidential advisers, what this is really all about is consolidating power around President Zelensky ahead of any change in policy.
Next, we had a storm of Ukrainian drone attacks. On September 10, Ukraine launched its biggest drone attack on Russian territory, launching 144 UAVs against multiple cities. At least 20 were launched against Moscow. The Russians claimed to have shot down nearly all the drones, but this cannot be the case, since in Moscow, one person was killed and three injured, and dozens of homes were wrecked. Fifty flights were diverted or suspended from Moscow’s four airports. In response, the Russians sent 46 drones into Ukrainian airspace. The attack is embarrassing for Putin but is unlikely to do the Russian leader any real harm at home. Ukraine, on the other hand, must be careful when targeting civilian lives and property if it wishes to retain the moral high ground, since the targeting of civilians is contrary to international law as laid down in the Conventions of the Hague and Geneva.
Thirdly, we have the ongoing Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region. I predicted in my last article that the Russians would trade space for time, as they traditionally do, and that once the Ukrainians were over-extended, they would strike back. Surprise, surprise, this is now what is happening: a major Russian counterattack has begun just over a month after the Ukrainian incursion, and appears to be making progress. This may, of course, have been foreseen by the Ukrainian General Staff; in fact it would be odd if it had not been, since they went to the same military schools as their Russian opposite numbers. Once his troops start losing ground in both the Donbass and Kursk, this is the obvious prompt for Zelensky other than to shout ever more loudly for Western direct intervention.
Which brings us to the most dangerous developments in the war thus far. [Permission to use British and French Storm Shadow cruise missiles against targets in Russian territory is being discussed](https
://www.twz.com/news-features/increasing-indications-storm-shadow-missiles-will-be-cleaned-for-use-inside-russia) – but this use requires US authorisation, as the missiles utilise American systems for targeting, and also are best used in conjunction with American HARM (High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles) which homes in on enemy radars and destroys them; also MALD (Miniature Air Launched Decoy), a small jet-propelled missile which simulates a larger craft to decoy enemy air defences. Hotheads in both the current and former British administrations have been eager to give permission to strike at Russia but have until now been held in check by US vetos. What may have changed this is reports that Russia has taken on foreign-supplied weapons – from Iran – for use against Ukraine.
The Russians’ stance is that the use of these weapons would amount to a direct Nato attack on Russia itself – and they are right, since these weapons are crewed by British and American servicemen and guided by American satellite systems. Even those systems such as HIMARS and ATACMs which are now crewed by Ukrainians have US officers and NCOs in overwatch. The obvious response is that the use of Iranian weapons means a declaration of war on the West by Iran – except that, of course, Iran and the West have been at war since the 1979 fall of the Shah.
If permission to use these weapons were given, perhaps the most likely targets would be Russian airfields and lines of communications. About 150 Storm Shadows (at around £900,000 a shot) are available, supported by limited stocks of other long-range munitions. Russian air defence is generally very effective, but even if half these weapons were shot down, it might prove impossible for Putin to resist the rising clamour in the Russian blogosphere to take direct action. A counterstrike might well kill Nato soldiers – and then what?
In the worst case, we appear to be on a three-step track to war. Step one has been the Russian expulsion of British diplomats. Step two, which could follow very quickly, would be a formal severing of diplomatic relations. Step three is war.
What can save us from Starmer’s attempts to embroil us in a war which we cannot win – no doubt at the behest of his chiefs in the World Economic Forum and the EU Commission? The answer is the US Joint Chiefs. No action is likely to be permitted this side of the American election in November, and probably not before the installation of a new president in January – if at all. The Joint Chiefs set their faces against any direct involvement in the war from the beginning and are unlikely to change their view now. Not least because they sense the end for Zelensky may be near, and in the ensuing negotiations a rapport of some sort will have to be struck with Putin. And it is their view that matters – not that of those in the EU Commission and the British government who have been, and remain, desperate for war. If their view prevails, we may come through – but there is always the possibility of miscalculation by either side.
TCW